04.05.07

春假过后的牢骚

Posted in 杂谈 at 4:29 pm by 若水

春假回家了一趟,费城纽约几所学校见了不少朋友,还有幸与教授一起在曼哈顿游逛,相当充实。回学校后发现房间被室友弄得一塌糊涂,便变得毫无干劲,快一星期过后觉得自己有如废柴。不过在此我一定要抱怨一番:若水我最讨厌的就是那些虚伪自私的人,把朋友当工具使,用完即甩,为了自己的利益一点都不讲义气。

话说回来了,昨日杜维明教授在课堂上提到,当年Summers校长还在时,不时邀请有兴趣的教授坐在一起讨论伦理问题。在一次讨论会上,Michael Sandel,知名政治学伦理学教授,经过多年教授我校最受欢迎的“正义”课之后,表明他不能确认学生上了他的课以后会在道德上有任何真正的感触。唯一能确定的只有一点:大部分的学生都是道德相对论者——而且是那种打着“自由主义”、“多元主义”牌子的肤浅相对论者。虽然我不同意Sandel的一些伦理学观点,但是想想发现他的观察太有道理了!这里的学生,大多都非常骄傲,非常有野心,自以为已经成为了政治家、商界巨豪,怎么想怎么做事情都跳不出“self-interest”的圈子。自愿者行为是为了resume,理想是为了能让自己显得与众不同而得到别人的重视;任何都能成为为了使“自我”受益的工具。而什么道德、伦理,自然也一样,成为了适用于自己的工具。对这种人来说,还有什么能胜于实为肤浅伦理相对论,名为“自由主义、多元主义”这个伪装呢?

阳明先生临终时说过“此心光明,亦復何言”!有多少哈佛本科学生配得上这句话呢?不,可能每个人都配得上:因为对于大部分的我们来说,我们自欺欺人的手法已经高人一等,自然能自圆其说,先骗别人,再骗自己。我也好不到哪里去。只不过我还是有那么点自知之明,直到自己虚伪也非常厌恶自己的虚伪,也知道自己傲慢不屑于其他的人。这一点我毫无隐瞒之意;不过也是这样,我才有了犬儒的权力,讥讽自己,嘲笑别人。

03.23.07

中庸、我的矛盾主义和更多的矛盾

Posted in 杂谈 at 2:55 pm by 若水

今日和一位许久未见的朋友聊天时跟他提及了我的矛盾主义,包括我那个儒、佛、基督教伊斯兰神秘主义都包括的个人信仰问题,他忽然觉得我的思想很“中庸”。当然,作为一个矛盾主义者,我是不能接受这个答案的。《礼记·中庸》曰,“喜怒哀乐之未发谓之中,发而皆中节谓之和”。“中”我肯定达不到,因为我在提倡“克己复礼”时同时会为了追求真实性而允许情感自由发挥。“和”也不能代表我的思想,因为我并不是在“中和”两个对立的极端,而是同时接受并且同时否认二者。用一个简单的数学例子来证明的话,“中”是说,0和0的平均值是0,“和”则是说,-1和1的平均值是“0”,而我的矛盾注意则压根就没有去想过“平均值”,而是说-1和1的绝对值是一样得,而真理的一部分则混杂这矛盾之中。好比说,我是一个乐观的悲观主义者,或者悲观的乐观主义者。这并不代表我实际上是乐观,无法接受悲观主义,或者相反,而是说,我会在完全接受人性悲观的事实时同时接受乐观的希望,或者在乐观的希望中找到悲观的绝望。朋友听过后,向我反映说理论多少有些不通。我回答道,“不通就对了,如果能“通”,怎么能称得上是矛盾呢?矛盾主义本身就是一个既通又不通的矛盾。”

春假

Posted in 杂谈 at 12:03 am by 若水

下午4点上完了社会理论课:在两小时沉闷玄谈“种族问题”后,室外的春风格外令人舒畅。几分钟前还有一种窒息的感觉,转眼就被一种体会到短暂“自由”的欣喜感觉替代了。我,坐在街道旁“天堂咖啡馆”(Cafe Paridiso)内,独自享受这提早到来春假的第一刻。说实在的这家咖啡馆多少有些差强人意,内部是绿色和蓝色所构成的一种现代格调,听不见什么像样的音乐,而且柜台后摆了不少冷饮和其他的瓶瓶罐罐,外加还零售冰淇凌,完全不能算得上是一所令人舒服的感觉。同时,店里有一股很重的熟食味,而缺少了咖啡香、茶香、书香。我点的是冰冻香料茶,还算勉强,但价格却不菲。后面一位客人跟着进了咖啡馆,找到了正在等他的朋友,隐隐约约听到他称赞此处为“永远有空位子的好地方”。我苦笑了一下,找了个靠窗的地方坐了下来:反正待会儿还有事情,不如休息一番,好好读读Mandelstam的诗歌,然后上网翻译点东西。哪知道这家店声称提供了网络,却还是要缴费的那种。想到这些心就冷了下来,看看时间,还是勉强一下好了。

最近经常有一种“想冲出去”。也可以说是”想逃出去”,但仔细想了想觉得使用“逃”太消极,而且也太便宜这个我属于的大学、社会、和生活了。往往事与人违,越发是在意和刻意的去抵触某些东西,就越发发现自己实际上更加主观的把自己的思想套死了。很多东西如果不刻意去钻牛角尖的话是根本就不成问题的;只有相信“有关联”才会存在。但我的性格是不容忍这种存在的。特别是那种“只要不想了就可以安稳生活”的想法,是绝对不能接受的。哪怕知道所想的可能是无关紧要的,是无益的,也要去挑战。这并不是一种“反抗”,一种主观的与某种思想对立,而只是一种自我性的肯定而已。当然,自己的做法很多方面是可笑的,甚至是可悲的。可惜我相信矛盾,喜欢这种追逐无益的生活。可能这就是一个犬儒的命运吧!

我不属于这里,也不属于另外一些地方,更不属于一个想象的“理想国”。正是这样我才有了自己的归属:我属于“不属于”,属于“矛盾”。也就是说,在那每一刻给自己带来痛苦的怀疑并同时怀疑自己怀疑的可能性的存在本身就是一种美好的生活。这每一秒自叹毫无艺术天赋就是一种艺术性的生活。这每一刻非理性的杂谈就是我的理性。

太阳是耀眼的;哪怕它只是一个内部黑暗的光圈所带来的幻觉也好,只要能在这一刻亲身感觉到它所带来的温暖,那又何妨?它刺瞎了我的双眼;虽然看不见前方,但只要还能体会到这种温暖,我就会一刻不停地去追寻着温暖的源泉。

03.21.07

诗歌一首

Posted in 诗歌 at 12:01 am by 若水

黑暗 夜在不留意时降临
哀声惆怅 倾听那古老的竖琴
小伙子 逃不出水晶宫 自己烦闷
遥望着城市 灯光 映紫了天的阴阴

我望着一行行文字 为谁发呆
饥饿 渴望 自比康桥乞丐
粉红 深红 猩红 变味的大海
向左 向右 迷宫中 横排竖排

瞳孔中的孩子 第一次 走上操场讲台
转眼 红领巾已在风中 散开
前天才抵达枫叶国 回首却已不再
南海沙滩的一个个脚印 被海水掩埋

想要挽留 却找不回你的踪影
流水盈科 大江东流 却无法唤醒
那沉睡的声音早已习惯梦中的安宁
他依然守着长夜 自悼 不知冥冥

03.20.07

妥协

Posted in 人文 at 2:16 am by 若水

晚上从燕京走出时发现又一次下雪了:过马路时,右侧的车灯印现出一粒粒的小雪花,像尘埃似的随风飞扬。黑暗。寒冷。毫无三月下旬应有的春意。有一种沉闷压抑的感觉,只想从速进入一个受保护的避难所,不想多逗留,就找到了一小门进入深红之园。小门不是往常熟悉,刻有庄严谚语的Dexter Gate,也不是Widener图书馆后面的大门,只是一个叫不上名字的小门。呈拱形,如园内的建筑一样由深红的砖块铸成。一盏暗黄的吊灯照亮了门内,微小的灯火驱逐了黑暗,却带来了另外一种威胁。不能在此久留!我欲离去,却突然发现了左侧墙上粉笔写的几行字——向后看;好奇心使我不知不觉地转身朝右侧的墙上望去,眼睛却恍惚了一阵子,只看到了几行同样粉笔书写的文字中间的两行——“沉默还不如死亡,那么就呐喊吧!” 沉默?死亡?呐喊!得承认当时确实被这几行不知哪位左派分子书写的愤世之言所打动,不由被震撼了一小会儿。对,不能沉默。阳明先生的“知行合一”之理不正是这样吗?如果找到了“道”——哪怕只是它的一小部分——却只沉默而留给自己,不就是没有办法把知道的履行而为“一事”吗?既然这样,就允许我一小会儿分享点想法吧!

之前与一位朋友交谈时提到了大家上大学期间很早即一个一个拼着命找实习接下来找工作的现象。我甚感不快,毕竟从自己的角度出发相信一个堂堂的大学教育应该不单单只是一个通往好工作、什么“成功之道”的垫脚石而已。说到最后,无论我们用什么借口来解释自己“现实性”的行动,不就是一种向社会的功利性妥协吗?如果用是否“妥协”来衡量一个人的生活的话,我们往往认为有两种状态:一种自然是“妥协”,也就是积极的参与社会成为社会机械的一分子——不管是为了名利、金钱还只是为了一个平稳的家庭生活,都是一种“妥协”;另外一种自然是“不妥协”,也就是理想主义者或者一个人理想主义阶段向社会风俗挑战的状态——结果往往是失望或者在一定时间后最终选择“妥协”。笔者认为,如果只从一个二元的观点来看这个问题的话就会陷入这个Either/or的弊端,在迫使主体进行二者之间的选择同时把他的自由已经限制在二者之间了。无论是”妥协“还是”不妥协“,都是有了一个明确的”妥协目标”——社会风气——而被动存在的。妥协自然不用说,但问题是哪怕”不妥协“也是建立在一种消极的排斥它的对立面,也就是”妥协”,才能存在的。如果用尼采的话来说的话,二者都是一种slave morality的表现。笔者认为,实际上第三种乃至更多的选择是存在的。也就是说,应该有一种境界是“现实的理想化”的:虽不接受社会风气,不愿“妥协”,却也不厌世而“不妥协”,而以自身的行动来创造一种超越性的存在。曾子云:“夫子之道,忠恕而已矣”(《论语·里仁》。忠诚与社会,以一种仁慈之心来看待它的风气与现象,体谅大家的选择,却同时以自身来做到超越性的存在,在身为其一部分时不必与大家走同样的道路却力图使大家都能走上对他们最好的、正确的道路,不就是所谓的“夫子之道”吗?

03.19.07

献给学子们

Posted in 人文 at 2:16 am by 若水

今日苦读阳明先生《传习录》,读到以下一段,觉得应该与海内外的广大学子们分享一番:

問:「讀書所以調攝此心,不可缺的。但讀之之時,一種科目意思牽引而來,不知同以免此?」先主曰:「只要良知真切,雖做舉榮,不為心累,雖有累,亦易覺克之而已。且如讀書時,良知知得強記之心不是,即克去之,有欲速之心不是,即克去之,有誇多斗靡之心不是,即克去之:如此亦只是終日與聖賢印對,是個純乎天理之心。任他讀書,亦只是調攝此心而已,何累之有?」曰:「雖蒙開示,奈負質庸下,實難免累:竊聞窮通有命,上智之人,恐不屑此不肖為聲利牽纖,甘心為此,徙自苫耳。欲屏棄之,又制於親,不能捨去,奈何?」先生曰:「此事歸辭於親者多矣;其實只是無志。志立得時,良知千事萬事只是一事。讀書作文,安能累人,人自累於得失耳!」因歎曰:「此學不明,不知此處擔擱了幾多英雄漢!」

阳明先生一番苦心,劝说大家不要为功名所惑,一定不能忘了“良知”。哪怕一开始是为了考试、为了成功而学,只要能有良知,就能去掉急于求成的心,争强好胜的心,强记死读书的心,和一切公里目的的心,从而印证自己本来即存有之天理之心。虽然我们不需要接受陆王心学“天理”、“良知”、“诚意”和“知行合一”等种种理念,却也可以在这真挚的对话中找到些感触吧!提问人实在是太像我们很多人了(当然也包括鄙人):他觉得自己资质低下,难得消除自己的负担——不像那些出生好的、天资聪明的人,不屑于功名——必须现实的面对科举考试来赢得功名。他觉得自己无助地受到了父母亲人朋友的期望或“约制”——不管是有形的还是无形的——而无法抛弃功利的想法去真正求学。阳明先生的回答甚有道理:我们不能怪罪于父母亲人朋友,而更应该自省,明白问题出在自己身上,是自己没有没有志向!当志向坚定时,心怀良知,无论做什么都是“一事”:此乃不违本心,为己而学,诚意修身,顺道而行之事。先生叹息,“此学不明,不知此处耽搁了几多英雄好汉!”扪心自问,难道这句话不就是针对吾辈现状的肺腑之言吗?鄙人不才,只希望这段话对广大学子们有些帮助。

03.18.07

诗歌一首

Posted in 诗歌 at 1:22 am by 若水

不要对我说这听到的每一句细语
这每一刻都能感触的身躯——
都只不过是一场骗局
一此又一次被伪装的空虚!

“此心光明,亦復何言”
阳明先生贵为先贤
可那耀眼无以伦比的美艳
在烟霞中潇洒若见

艺术!啊,艺术——
难道你还甘做借口的附属物?
在意识形态中沉淀进一本本厚书?
无助平庸的凡人为你而哭。

窒息的教室被尖鸣震撼
他们一个个拿起自己
一如既往地离开驿站
灵魂失去了记忆——早已各自离席

我歌唱他们的希望
和我们一次次的反抗

03.16.07

写在忙碌之余

Posted in 杂谈 at 3:34 pm by 若水

前天还是阳光明媚,好似即将春满花开的样子,今朝却被灰朦阴天唤醒。零下寒风将一丝春意的美梦化为泡影,康桥路人又一次披上了呢绒大衣,走过又一个平凡的周五。哈佛园中前几天嬉戏的新生大部分可能还在睡梦中,而我,一个总是“很忙”的路人,如往常一般推单车而过。我从“安能堡”,一个不再属于我的地方,走出,横穿哈佛园回我那久违了的“第二家”,Lamont图书馆。“安能堡”(Annenberg) 乃一新生食堂,除了早上以外不对我们这些“老人”开放,其食物质量虽差强人意,不愧其“安能饱”之名,但建筑宏伟,室内有多个美观的彩色玻璃,刻画了由荷马至安德洛玛刻的历史神话人物。如能按时起床,我好坐在安能堡内进食早餐,感受那种光透过彩色玻璃射进大堂的感觉,试图找寻自己的灵感。不留神我已经坐在了Lamont图书馆五楼靠窗子的小桌,而难得能享受的早上也即将过去。举头望去,一辆辆汽车在忙碌的马萨诸塞大道驶过,而雪花则又一次飘洒在波士顿城中。又一日来临了。听着Stan Getz的爵士乐,我冥想着一些过去的和无法消除的事情。但往事总会若水一般流逝,而无法避免的则是又一次面对忙碌的生活。孟子说过,“流水之为物也,不盈科不行;君子之志于道也,不成章不达。”即是说,流水会将坑洼一个个地填满,而一步步走下去,顺理成章,则近道亦!历史也罢、生活也罢、社会也罢,自然会顺天道而行;所以我要感触这个世界,这个丑恶却美丽的生活。窗外雀鸟在屋檐上稍息片刻即各自离去。一点一点的雪花已经由少变多,遮盖了我的视线。

Xiaofei Tian: Tao Yuanming & Manuscript Culture

Posted in 说书 at 4:27 am by 若水

这几日有空读了田晓菲老师的Tao Yuanming & Manuscript Culture: The Record of a Dusty Table (中文好像会翻成《尘几录——陶诗论稿》)。田老师在此著作中刻画了一个鲜为人知的陶潜:北宋以降,受东坡影响,大部分文人都将渊明看作一脱俗的隐士,并顺其意来解其诗。作者则指出六朝之时的中国文化界乃一“手稿文化”:在印刷术盛行之前,文本的流传往往经过了经过不同人之手,以不同的版本展现在我们面前。好比说,“采菊东篱下,悠然望南山”此二句就引出了后人强加的误解。苏轼提出,“悠然见南山”才是正确的版本,而“望”则是文本流传过程所致之失误:作为隐士的陶潜不会刻意去“望”南山,而只会不留意“见”南山。此观点被多数后人所采。但实际上这二句却可能有不同的意义。作者提出,在六朝时士人思想受老庄之道影响,好清谈玄学,隐居求仙:后人把“菊”认为是一种渊明隐居的比喻,而实际上当时菊花则与“长生不老”更有关联,为草药之一种。如果此观点的话,就不难理解“望”南山了。诗中可能并无那种刻意强调“隐士”的概念——此概念本身可能是后人强加的。作者更提出,陶潜传记并不肯定,无论是《晋书》、《南史》、《宋书》,还是萧统《文选》中渊明之传记,均有相似记载:“潜少怀高尚,博学,善属文,任真自得,为乡邻之所贵,尝著《五柳先生传》以自况,曰:‘先生不知何许人,不详姓字,宅有五柳树,因以为号焉。闲静少言, 不慕荣利。好读书,不求甚解,每有会意,欣然忘食。性嗜酒,而家贫不能恒得,亲旧知其如此,或置酒招之,造饮必尽,期在必醉,既醉而退,曾不吝情。环诸萧 然,不蔽风日,短褐穿结,箪瓢屡空,晏如也。常著文章自娱,颇示己志,忘怀得失,以此自终。”(《晋书·陶潜传》) 也就是说,对陶潜记载多出于其自传:而其自传则是一个名曰五柳先生的虚构人物之传记。陶潜作为“隐士”,也是由他一手打造的。作者则反问:如果陶谦真的是一隐士,为何要留下字据自谓“隐士”?好个“不祥姓字”!当然,作者也明白,“我们得记住这个‘少了些平静少了些不朽的陶渊明’也不能算是权威性版本。它只是很多个可能性中的一个,一个经常被刻意无视了的可能性而已。”作者希望通过陶渊明的例子来说明“多个”陶渊明存在的可能性,以突出中世纪中国的文献不稳定性以及其文献在不同注疏者笔下由于个人或意识形态需要改变而自成一体的现象。通过展现陶诗的不同版本以及东晋刘宋之交的文化以刻画一“手稿文化”,此作品不失为一佳作。



03.14.07

Essay: Autonomy or Unity

Posted in 人文 at 8:53 pm by 若水

Autonomy or Unity—
An Analysis of the Relationships of Li, Creativity, and Heaven in Xunzi with a Brief Comparison to Those in Zhongyong

The School of Xunzi has long been considered heterodox in Chinese Confucian tradition, leaving both the text and its doctrines largely ignored for centuries. This paper shall examine the concepts of li, creativity, and Heaven in the text of Xunzi 荀子to demonstrate the separate and autonomous relationship among the three to illustrate a humanistic school of thought with a sociopolitical realistic aspiration for stability. It shall further compare these relationships to those of Zhongyong 中庸, a text to central the school of Zisi and Mencius, to illustrate a different approach taken by a philosophy that metaphysically unites all three through its defining concept of anthropocosmic unity, 天人合一.

The text of Xunzi closely ties the concept of li, translated into “propriety” and sometimes “ritual”, with the notion of learning. In the first chapter of the text, “Encouraging Learning”, Xunzi states that “learning begins with the recitation of the Classics and ends with the reading of the ritual [li ] texts; and as to objective, it beings with learning to be a man of breeding, and ends with learning to be a sage”.[1] This statement suggests that as far as the physical act of learning is concerned, the importance of a certain collection of texts that describe li is paramount, even more so than the recitation of Classics. Only after one fluently recites the Classics can he then understands li through reading these texts. In addition, the reading of these texts, i.e. the performance and understanding of li, in terms of its objective, is aligned with “learning to be a sage”. Xunzi, indeed, believes li to be “the great basis of law and the foundation of precedents”[2]. The purpose of li, then, sets a sociopolitical aspiration for learning; “basis of law” and “foundation of precedents” corresponds to legitimacy of politics and social norms, respectively. But at the same time, li fulfills an order that is manifest, but nonetheless beyond mere sociopolitical structures, as evident in the immediately following line from the previous statement: “therefore learning reaches its completion with the rituals, for they may be said to represent the highest point of the Way and its power”.[3] Li completes learning to represent Dao , the Confucian way, which encompasses the sociopolitical “basis of law” and “foundation of precedents”, but broadens to include human, natural, and cosmic order all together. As A.S. Cua notes, the concept of li formulates in three stages, first as an idea of rule in the sense of archaic religious rites, then as “a comprehensive notion embracing all social habits and customs acknowledged and accepted as a set of action-guiding rules”, with the third “connected with the notions of right (yi) and reason (li)” to accept as an exemplary rule of conduct for “any rule that is right and reasonable”.[4] Hence, li as sociopolitical ordering affixes to the second stage, while it as a symbol of Dao concerns with the third stage.

Xunzi further discusses li as a force that counters and contains man’s natural, base desires. These desires create tensions between men and generates disorder; to counter these disorder the ancient sage kings created li in order to curb these desires, viz. to allow the appropriate satisfaction to the desires in which neither desire exceeds the necessary condition for satisfaction nor the material good lacking to satisfy the said desire— this process explains the logical sequence from “man is born with desires” to “rites [li] are a means of satisfaction”.[5] Xunzi explains that the concept of li contains a conduct of life with the rightful desires appropriate to sociopolitical order, “therefore, if a man concentrates upon fulfilling ritual principles, then he may satisfy both his human desires and the demands of ritual; but if he concentrates only upon fulfilling his desires, then he will end by satisfying neither”.[6] From here it is evident that Xunzi’s concept of li contains an inner transformative force; the practice of li not only ensures that man fulfills the demand of li, that is, sociopolitical norms necessarily for stability, but also the satisfaction of human desires, as the practice of li standardizes the desire into a normative, balanced set of accepted needs. The transformative li, Xunzi states, has the following three foundations: “Heaven and earth are the basis of life, the ancestors are the basis of the family, and rulers and teachers are the basis of order”.[7] Li, then, roots itself deeply with the birth of humanity, the formulation of family, and sociopolitical order; it is a crucial force that harmonizes the natural institutions of heaven-and-earth, family, and society, through which “Heaven and earth join in in harmony, the sun and moon shine, the four season proceed in order, the stars and constellations march, the rivers flow, and all things flourish”.[8] Hence, not only is this li internally transformative, it also affirms a greater order of natural to be one that both imitates and take part in the maintenance of nature. As a result of this belief to li’s importance in both inner transformation and maintenance of nature, Xunzi’s li, to fulfill its two-fold function, is very minute and detailed to incorporate different aspects of social practices, from the proper dealing with auspicious and inauspicious events to the proper containment and display of one’s emotions. Especially detailed is the li of death: as a connecting force that joins man’s life with nature, death needs the most attention paid by li to maintain this natural order.

Why, then, exists li, this completion of learning, inner-transformative force that corresponds to nature? To Xunzi, this question is closely related to his understanding of human nature, and ultimately will be answered by human creativity. Xunzi shows a rather dim view on such a subject:

Man’s nature is evil; goodness is the result of conscious activity []. The nature of man is such that he is born with a fondness for profit. If he indulges this fondness, it will lead him into wrangling and strife, and all sense of courtesy and humility will disappear. He is born with feelings of envy and hate, and if he indulges these, they will lead him into violence and crime, and all sense f loyalty and good faith will disappear. Man is born with the desires of the eyes and ears, with a fondness for beautiful sights and sounds. If he indulges these, they will lead him into license and wantonness, and all ritual principle and correct forms will be lost. Hence, any man who follows his nature and indulges his emotions will inevitably become involved in wrangling and strive, will violate the forms and rules of society, and will end as a criminal.[9]

Xunzi’s Hobbesian approach to man’s nature requires a solution to inevitable disorder that natural tendencies will cause. Unlike Hobbes who proposes a contractual relationship between man and a powerful sovereign who safeguards his life from others and maintain an external social order, Xunzi promotes the learning of li to internally transform man to become good—“man must first be transformed by the instructions of a teacher and guided by ritual principles, and only then will he be able to observe the dictates of courtesy and humility, obey the forms and rules of society, and achieve order”, with the end product of this learning and adjustment process the flourishing of goodness, “result of conscious activity”.[10]

From this notion of “conscious activity” , then, a further question should be raised on the original origin of li, and of this “conscious activity”—what force contains this notion of creativity to generate these set of principles? Xunzi makes it clear that “all ritual principles are produced by the conscious activity of the sages; essentially they are not products of man’s nature”.[11] The sages, serving as the human par excellence both for their moral authority and their creativity ability, consciously creates li with a clear intension to maintain a form of sociopolitical and natural order. Taking the roles of ideal types of human achievement, these sages represent the collective effort of man to ordain proper order in maintaining the stability of society both internally in terms of interpersonal relationships, and externally in the relationship between man and nature. The creation process of li is completely conscious and artificial; it involves the sages, or humanity’s intelligence and wisdom as generative forces as a reaction to nature rather than a decreed patterning of heaven in the tradition of Zisi and Mencius: “the sage gathers together his thoughts and ideas, experiments with various forms of conscious activity, and so produces ritual principles and set forth laws and regulations”.[12] The gathering of “thoughts and ideas” and “experiments with various forms of conscious activity” marks Xunzi’s notion of human creativity a truly humanistic one; he does not doctrines that govern human behavior as laws or covenants with a personal God, or deliberate patterning to an external force, but instead places human creativity to the center stage to establish his proper place within to maintain society, and without to face nature.

Absent in Xunzi’s philosophy of li, then, is an active role for Heaven , the predominant concept of Confucianism in the tradition of Zisi and Mencius. In his “Discussion of Heaven”, Xunzi clearly states that “Heaven’s ways are constant… it does not prevail because of a sage like Yao; it does not cease to prevail because of a tyrant like Chieh”.[13] Xunzi separates man’s action with heaven’s will completely, and hence, removes from his moral philosophy a clear metaphysical connection to Heaven. To Xunzi man’s fortune is up to his own, and a sage is he who can realize this simple fact.[14] However, the passive role of Heaven in human creativity does not eliminate its significance; it is a complete and natural process on its own. Xunzi states, “to bring to completion without acting, to obtain without seeking—this is the work of Heaven”, which a sage does not attempt to imitate. [15] The natural cycle of heaven, with its change of four seasons, transformation of yin and yang, is a complete, godlike process that marks itself an accomplishment.[16] T, Xunzi’s notion of heaven is similar to a modern understanding of nature, beyond man’s control, operating on its own, yet influencing man in its phenomena. Man is bound by heaven only insofar as his action does not oppose the natural order of things, or expect from heaven what is beyond man’s power.[17]

The relationship between li, creativity, and Heaven in Xunzi, then, can be characterized by that of distinction and independently separate, autonomous existence. Li is a product of man, resulted from sages’ conscious activity to function in accordance to Heaven only insofar as its actions do not oppose Heaven’s natural order. Heaven, though its already complete pattern, though influencing li and man’s creativity by the boundary of its natural orders, cannot change or be changed beyond its completion. Human conscious action, or creativity, product of human intellect and wisdom, though the generator of li and an observer of Heaven, does not serve as a unifying force that unites man with Heaven.

Radically opposing Xunzi’s view on li, creativity, and Heaven is that of the school of Zisi and Mencius, as evident in Zhongyong. Instead of perceiving these three as separate, autonomous subjects, Zhongyong offers a holistic anthropocosmic unity that allows close interaction, patterning, and co-creation of the three. First, the concept of li is connected to ren , or humanity:

Benevolence is the characteristic element of humanity [], and the great exercise of it is in loving relatives. Righteousness is the accordance of actions with what is right, and the great exercise of it is in honouring the worthy. The decreasing measures of the love due to relatives, and the steps in the honour due to the worthy, are produced by the principle of propriety [] [Zhongyong XX.5].[18]

Humanity, in turn, is further associated with the Zhongyong concept of creativity, known as co-creativity, cheng , sometimes translated into sincerity:

The possessor of sincerity [] does not merely accomplish the self-completion of himself. With this quality he completes other men and things also. The completing himself shows his perfect virtue []. The completing other men and things show his knowledge. Both these are virtues belonging to the nature, and this is the way by which a union is effected of the external and internal. Theserefore, whever he—the entirely sincere man—employs them, –that is, these virtues, –their action will be right [Zhongyong XXV.3].[19]

Cheng is best represented by the term co-creativity because it is the force that creates a metaphysics of morals for Zhongyong, that which connects man with heaven as co-creators in a cosmology characterized by anthropocosmic unity, 天人合一:

It is only the individual possessed of the most entire sincerity [] that can exist under heaven [], who can adjust the great invariable relations of mankind, establish the great fundamental virtues of humanity, and know the transforming and nurturning operations of Heaven and Earth; –shall this individual have any being or anything beyond himself on which he depends? Call him man in his ideal [], how earnest he is! Call him an abyss, how deep is he! Call him Heaven [], how vast is he! [XXXII.1-2].[20]

In the cosmology of Zhongyong, then, the concepts of li, creativity, and Heaven are connected by an individual, a possessor of co-creativity cheng , that Tu Weiming describes as a “profound person” whom, “through a long and unceasing process of delving into his own ground of existence, discovers his true subjectivity not as an isolated selfhood but as a great source of creative transformation”.[21] This profound person, through his realization of heaven’s pattern and his role as a co-creator, does not create through his intelligence, but transmits through the pattern of heaven, the proper governance of action, li, as a spontaneous act from his inner humanity, ren . Hence, through this active process of co-creativity, anthropocosmic unity 天人合一 is achieved.

An analogy of the cosmology of Xunzi and that of Zhongyong, then, presents two radically different approaches to the relationships between li, creativity, and Heaven. But perhaps these differences can be explained in terms of basic approaches by these two distinct schools of Confucianism. The school of Xunzi starts from a sociopolitical realistic perspective that, through realization of the baseness of human nature and man’s instinctual desires, seeks to create sociopolitical order through deliberate human creativity, conscious action , to generate a set of conduct known as li from human intelligence and wisdom. The li is to be the completion of learning, which the man, with his base nature, ought to ceaselessly pursue to attain the good. Heaven plays no active role to the sociopolitical realist, who only wishes man not to disrupt its natural orders to create further chaos. Man’s role in Xunzi’s system serves as an intelligent and autonomous creator, who at the same time attempts to tame his nature through following the li of sages. Ultimately, each of the three concepts is distinct and autonomous, with no single unifying factor. Zhongyong, on the other hand, starts from a philosophical and optimistic approach to human nature, assuming its natural capacity for humanity, ren , and allows a profound person to unify all three through his realization of cheng , his capacity and duty of co-creativity. The process of this unification is man’s internal growth to the realization of through self-cultivation. Li is the natural external manifestation of this realization, rather than a process of normative learning of the good; it is patterned after man’s understanding of Heaven, as man acts in accordance to Heaven’s will. Although man in both of these texts assume this role of the creator, they are nonetheless different: while he who follows the school of Xunzi realizes and creates artifice through conscious action, , the profound man interacts with Heaven to pattern with sincerity, .




[1] Burton Watson, Hsün-Tzu (New York: Columbia UP, 1996), 19.

[2] Ibid., 19.

[3] Ibid., 19.

[4] A. S. Cua, “The Ethical and the Religious Dimensions of Li”, in Confucian Spirituality, Volume One, ed. Tu Weiming and Mary Evelyn Tucker (New York: Herder and Herder, 2003), 254.

[5] Watson, 89.

[6] Ibid., 91

[7] Ibid., 91.

[8] Ibid., 94.

[9] Ibid., 157.

[10] Ibid., 157.

[11] Ibid., 160.

[12] Ibid., 160.

[13] Ibid., 79.

[14] Ibid., 79-80.

[15] Ibid., 80.

[16] Ibid., 80.

[17] Ibid., 83.

[18] Confucius, Analects, Great Learning, and Doctrine of the Mean, trans. James Legge (New York, Dover: 1971), 405-406

[19] Ibid., 418-419.

[20] Ibid., 430.

[21] Tu Wei-ming, Centrality and Commonality (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1989), 91.

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