11 I 2008
Leo Strauss, in presenting the conflict between natural right and history, seems to have based his judgment too much on the conflict between the former idea with a particular school, viz. historicism. According to Strauss, natural right stands for consistency that stands regardless of time, while historicism is a school of extreme relativism, in which no objective knowledge can be assumed without paying attention to historical particularities. Both cases, however, seem to be rather extremist: although natural right stands for that which is natural, or that which is observable universally and objectively, it does not have to be hostile to notions of historical consciousness. Notions of the natural itself, as Strauss demonstrates, changes over time; and it would be prejudice to assume that only the more aged one has claim of validity. Even if the notion itself contains possibility of objectivity, history brings development of its understanding and should not be rejected for objectivity. On the other hand, historical consciousness does not necessarily yield complete subjectivist understandings. Sure enough–each idea only takes shape in its particular historical framework; but this notion does not eliminate possibility of continuation and elements of objectivity in the course of history. To subscribe to this extreme form of relativism contains no fewer error than to follow historical determinism; specific facts particular to a setting and general trends both should be noted in our historical consciousness. The best we can do, in most cases, are but to use our reason to a certain extent to approximate the likelihood of things–any claim of Truth in completion should probably be rejected after skeptical scrutiny.
Regardless, Strauss’ analysis of the development from ancient natural right to modern natural law is very detailed and insightful. If things permit, I shall examine the rest of this book in detail.
